Joe Petraroli

I am a Master's student of philosophy at Tufts University. My research focuses on ontology, but I also am interested in logic and the history of metaphysics. Lately I have been concerned with questions about generality. Examples: Is everything actual?, Can everything make some statement true?, Is everything either F or not-F for any property F?

Works in Progress

Russellian Objections to Modal Meinongianism

(metaphysics, logic, non-existence, modality, Russell, Meinong) 

Russell claimed and Meinong denied that everything exists. After looking at Russell’s objections to Meinong from LEM and LNC, I reformulate them against Priest's modal Meinongianism.

What Are the Per Se Attributes of Being Qua Being?

(Aristotle, being, ontology, properties, generality, necessity, essence)

Appealing to APo, Shields formulates a condition satisfied by the attributes that every being has qua being. I use the condition to revise an inventory of such attributes identified by Aristotle in Met.

Ordinary Objects Do Not Have Modal Parts

(metaphysics, mereology, modality, identity, semantics, causation, fission, persons)

Lewis (1986) raises several objections to the view that ordinary objects have parts in multiple worlds. Wallace (2019) argues that Lewis’ objections fail. I defend Lewis.

Divine Priority

(philosophy of religion, metaphysics, mereology, identity, modality, time)

Divine simplicity supports God’s aseity, but leads to contradiction. Fowler offers an alternative—divine priority—based on Schaffer’s (2010) priority monism. I further develop divine priority.

Substrata Are Manifold Points

(metaphysics, philosophy of physics, bundle-substratum debate, general relativity)

Locke claims a substratum bears properties but is unknowable. Armstrong proposes that substrata be identified with spacetime points. I modify his proposal based on general relativity.